The Victory Trap: Endogenous Opposition Coalition Weaknesses in Reversing Autocracy

with Elvin Ong (National University of Singapore), conditionally accepted, Perspectives on Politics.

 

When opposition parties and alliances win against dominant autocratic incumbents, what challenges do they encounter in reversing autocracy and what are the consequences? We argue that long-neglected endogenous weaknesses in opposition coalitions undermine re-democratization efforts, easily opening the door to autocratic comebacks. First, coalition intra-elite conflicts post-victory result in fractured and ineffective governance, generating mass disappointment with the new political elites. Second, coalition intra-supporter divergence pressure the new coalition government into haphazard speed and scope of pro-democratic reforms. Any swift actions in reversing autocracy alienates supporters of the ex-autocrat, elicits accusations of partisan revenge, and fuels counter-mobilization against the new government. A most different case comparison between the recent autocratic reversal experiences of Poland and Malaysia demonstrates our argument. We show in both cases ideological and distributional conflicts among diverse coalition elites undermine governance after victory, and how different supporter bases prioritize different policy agendas. Counter-mobilization by the autocratic ex-incumbents become highly successful in undermining public support for the new government. These findings suggest profound challenges in reversing autocracy and rebuilding democracy lie within opposition coalitions themselves, in addition to authoritarian legacies.

Draft available on request.